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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, I 
a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INTRUSION-PREPAKT, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9292 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in appellant's brief is substantially 
correct; the discrepancies will be pointed out hereinafter. 
In this action the plaintiff sought to recover from the 
defendant the sum of $3,580.52, interest and costs, for repairing 
a Chicago Pneumatic rotary compressor (Model 600) leased 
by plaintiff to defendant in July, 1958. The lease was a standard 
form prepared and used by plaintiff, the company's name being 
imprinted at the top. 
.3 
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It is undisputed that a compressor was delivered to 
defendant, that defendant used it for about two weeks, that 
on or about July 24 the compressor either quit running or one 
of the defendant's employees stopped it, and that thereafter 
the compressor was· repaired by plaintiff. Issue was joined on 
whether and to what extent the repairs were chargeable to 
defendant. 
At the trial plaintiff produced the lease and a parade of 
workmen, executives and bookkeepers-all employed by plain-
tiff-who told how they kept or didn't keep records and what 
they did or didn't do to the compressor, the proof at the trial 
and plaintiff's contention on this appeal apparently being based 
upon the theory that quantity of witnesses is somehow equivalent 
to quality of proof. 
A reading of the lease (Exhibit 1) makes it clear that there 
are some situations contemplated in which the cost of repairs 
will be borne by the lessor, nor the lessee, and that the amount 
to which the lessor is entitled for making repairs are its ((regular 
charges" in some cases but its ((damages" in others. The follow-
ing excerpts from the lease bear upon its construction and 
upon the consequent liability of the lessee to the lessor for 
repatrs. 
((4. The lessor shall use reasonable care to see that 
the equipment is in proper working condition before 
shipment to lessee." 
(( 5. On non-tractor equipment the lessee agrees to 
maintain said n1achinery and equipment in the same 
condition as when delivered to it by the lessor, usual 
wear and tear excepted, * * * and to pay for all damages 
to the equipment, except the usual and ordinary wear 
.4 
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and tear * * * and to return said property in as good 
condition as when received * * * usual and ordinary 
'vear and tear excepted * * * . On all tractor equip-
meJ?t, the conditions in Paragraph 5 apply except that 
the lessee agrees to fully 1naintain the machinery 
covered in this contract while in his possession and 
return it in the same condition as received from the 
lessor or with no exception made for wear and tear." 
(Emphasis added.) 
0 8. In the event of notice to the lessor by the lessee 
that the equipment is not in good, safe and serviceable 
condition and fit for use upon its arrival, lessor shall 
have the right to put said equipment in good, safe and 
serviceable condition and fit for use, within a reasonable 
time, or to cancel this lease." 
(( 10. In the event of accident to, or breakage of, any 
part of the equiptnent * * * the lessor may repair said 
machinery for the lessee, using reasonable diligence to 
make said repairs or replacements in the shortest pos-
sible time, and the lessee agrees to pay the lessor its 
regular charges for any material or labor furnished in 
making said repairs upon demand; in the event any 
work is done outside of lessor's regular hours, including 
work necessary by wear and tear, by reason of which 
lessor shall be required to pay double time or other 
overtime charges to its employees, or to anyone doing 
the work for lessee, all of such charges will be paid 
by the lessee to the lessor.'' 
'' 11. In the event the lessee accepts the machinery 
and equi pn1ent, as herein provided, and thereafter the 
said machinery proves defective or unfit for use, because 
of accident or otherwise or, if for any other reason 
lessee desires to discontinue the use of said machinery 
or equipment, the only remedy of lessee shall be to 
return the machinery to lessor and terminate this con-
tract as herein elsewhere provided for * * * " 
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(( 14. The lessee agrees to pay the lessor for all loss 
and damage as occasioned by fire, theft, flood, accident, 
explosion, wreck, an act of God or any other cause that 
may occur during the life of this lease * * * . For the 
purpose of :finding the valuation of said property in 
order to detennine the loss, damage or injury thereto, 
it is agreed by the parties hereto that the value as 
hereinbefore stated shall be a true and just value form-
ing a basis for such adjustment * * * ." 
No one knew whether the compressor was inspected or 
tested prior to the time of its delivery to defendant. Eugene 
Sandell, No. 1 in the parade, thought that it would have been 
done by Merle Kirkham (R. 96), but Mr. Kirkham, No. 2, 
didn't see the machine prior to the time it was delivered to 
the defendant (R. 122). There were no records available in 
Salt Lake City, apparently, which would indicate what was done 
to the machine there (R. 168). 
After plaintiff was notified that the compressor was not 
operating, it was picked up for repair. But plaintiff did some 
things that seem unrelated to the repair of the compressor. 
For example, there was a charge for engine oil filters, engine 
oil, fuel filters (Exhibit 3, R. 113), {(making out expenses and 
travel" (R. 126), and (for plaintiff's convenience), installing 
a new pilot bearing (Exhibit 3, R. 106). 
Mr. Sandell brought out also that the compressor was not 
flushed out at Idaho Falls, even though the oil was noted to 
be black and the rotor blades deteriorated (R. 101). A tele-
phone call from Salt Lake City to Idaho Falls (it is not clear 
whether this was charged to the defendant or not) suggested 
that the machine, having been completely repaired, should be 
flushed out (R. 102). Defendant was required to pay for 37 
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gallons of compressor oil to replace 32 gallons already charged 
to it (Exhibit 3, R. 111). 
Mr. Sandell testified that the parts listed on the invoices, 
and upon which the charges of Arnold Machinery Company 
against the plaintiff were based, were ((list prices" and that 
the list price did not represent plaintiff's cost (R. 107). He 
testified that the mark-up varies, item by item, but the witness 
agreed with his employer's counsel that the mark-up or any 
particular item was ((irrelevant," because it varies all the way 
down (R. 107). 
Merle G. Kirkham testified that the first time the machine 
was taken into Idaho Falls the oil was drained out of the supply 
reservoir but he didn't look at it (R. 119), that he vol11;ntaril y 
changed the engine oil (R. 116), and that he didn't check 
the meter at the time of delivery to tell how many hours the 
machine had been operated. 
Jack W. Gunn couldn't remember the time he worked on 
the machine but assumed that the time slips shown him were 
correct (R. 123). 
Mike Uzelac, another of plaintiff's workmen, testified that 
part of the work he did on the compressor after its redelivery 
to Salt Lake City was ((preventive maintenance" and that part 
of the time he had spent was to ((make out expense and travel'' 
(R. 126). He was not sure (R. 126) whether part of his time 
was on another job. He didn't classify the damage to the 
compressor as being ((usual wear and tear" but he expressed 
no opinion as to what it would be classified in the trade, or 
what the phrase meant as between the plaintiff and the 
defendant (R. 128). Mr. Uzelac also testified that he didn't 
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know where a piece of metal (that he regarded as being respon-
sible for the oil failure and damage to the machine) came 
from nor how it could be put into the machine (R. 128). He 
didn't know hoV\.r long filters last (R. 129) ; he wasn't familiar 
with the machine of this particular type (R. 129) ; at the time 
he did some work at Idaho Falls he didn't have a strainer 
to check the oil ( R. 131 [which must have been true, since 
there was no charge for a strainer on any Arnold invoice). 
Mr. Uzelac didn't remember whether any pieces were missing 
from the bearings in the machine (R. 133). 
Mr. Allen J. Walker, fifth man in plaintiff's parade, 
testified that he repaired part of the machine, that there was 
a thermostat to protect the machine from overheating (R. 136). 
David Liese, the only one of plaintiff's witnesses who 
seemed to understand the workings of a Chicago Pneumatic 
rotary compressor, stated that there was a spiral of brass metal 
lodged bet"\\reen the high and low pressure cases which caused 
oil starvation and resultant damage to the machine (R. 139). 
He wouldn't describe the damage as ttusual and ordinary wear 
and tear," but neither did he state anything about what the 
custom in the trade was or what usual and ordinary wear and 
tear meant to the plaintiff and defendant at the time they 
entered into the contract. He testified further that used parts 
were not put into the machine because he couldn't guaranty 
that they would work properly (R. 142). He didn't know where 
the metal came from (R. 142); it could have bypassed the 
oil filter if the filter was dirty (R. 143). Filters can be used 
for as n1uch as 500 hours and would not ordinarily be changed 
or cleaned in less than 100 hours; if a piece of metal bypassed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the filter he would assume that the filter was dirty (R. 145). 
The Chicago Pneumatic rotary compressor has very small 
tolerances and the manufacturer recommends checking the 
blades every 1,000 hours (R. 147). The metal particle in 
question was drawn in with a flow of oil (R. 150); he wouldn't 
expect the particle to bypass a clean filter (R. 151). Mr. Liese 
failed to answer responsively a question as to the number of 
hours of operation which the machine would ordinarily be 
expected to have prior to a complete overhaul (R. 151) . He 
testified that if the air in the machine gets too hot the machine 
should shut itself off (R. 15 2) ; and that the air would have 
to be much hotter than the shut-off point to cause the discolor-
ation noted in the metal in the machine (R. 15 3) . 
William D. Hoffman took the stand to testify as to the 
time necessary to ((repair the unit" (R. 156), Alma D. Jackson 
did about the same (R. 158), and Alfred Glende testified, in 
substance, that he was plaintiff's invoice clerk. 
Robert D. Arnold, plaintiff's sales manager and treasurer, 
testified that the check ordinarily made of equipment prior 
to being shipped to a lessee did not include looking at the oil 
filters or checking the safety features (R. 164) ; that the value 
of the machine was $13,000.00 at the time of the contract 
and after the repairs were made. He didn't testify as to the 
value of the machine immediate! y before the damage but 
presumably the $13,000.00 figure would have seemed right to 
him. 
Mr. Arnold also testified that the machine cost Arnold 
Machinery Company $12,491.00 when it was purchased in 
February, 1956 (R. 165). Since that time it has been used in 
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Arnold Machinery Company's rental fleet, but Mr. Arnold 
didn't know how many hours the machine had been operated 
(R. 165-166). He would assume that the machine would be 
operated no more than 175 hours per month (R. 167), though, 
as rna y be noted from the lease, lessees are permitted to operate 
the machine for 240 hours each month without extra charge. 
The company does not maintain any records of the excess use 
to which the machine may have been put by its lessees (R. 167). 
The machine has never been overhauled (R. 167). At the 
time a machine is leased, it is ordinarii y checked to see if it 
is ((producing air" (R. 168). But in this particular instance 
there was no record of what service was performed or what 
checks made on the machine (R. 168). The ((list price" of the 
machine at the time it was purchased for $12,491.00 was 
$18,500.00 and the value of the time of rental (based on cclist 
price") was $13,000.00 (R. 169). The time at which the 
machine was overhauled, he said, would depend upon the kind 
of use to which the machine had been put. He didn,t know 
what kind of use the machine had had (R. 167-170). He didn't 
know how long the unit had been run (R. 171). It is the 
standard practice of Arnold Machinery Company to overhaul 
machines when an overhaul is needed (R. 171). 
The defendant called only one witness. Clifford Kullberg, 
who was the plaintiff's job superintendent, testified that it was 
his practice on the job to use an operating engineer to keep 
track of the machinery (R. 172). Yet some of the air machinery 
being operated off the compressor operated poorly from the 
time the con1pressor was received, the equipment not ((hitting 
hard enough" and the air volume appeared to be low (R. 174). 
He attempted to rectify the trouble by repairing some of the 
10 
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other equipment, but after the compressor was repaired by 
Arnold, the other equipment began to ·"vork all right. The 
compressor was used for only 77 hours by the defendant before 
it broke down (R. 175). 
With reference to the statement of facts contained in 
the appellant's brief: on page 2 the appellant states that the 
compressor worked ((perfectly'' from the time of its delivery 
on July 10 until July 24, confusing evidence with fact. The 
evidence was in a double hearsay statement contained in a 
letter introduced in evidence over the objection of the defendant 
(Exhibit 9) ; but the jury was justified in believing from Mr. 
Kullberg's testimony that something was the matter with the 
machine when it was received at the dam site-though the 
\vorkmen did not know it. The court's statement to the jury 
was not to the effect that the jury could do whatever it wanted 
to do with damages neven though there was no evidence on 
the point," as stated by appellant. According to the record 
(R. 188-189) : 
ttl informed the jury that under my instructions they 
were at liberty to return such amount as they, in their 
judgment, deemed proper * * * . I also informed them 
that an objection had been sustained to the question 
relative to Arnold Machinery Company's cost and that 
after consultation with counsel that the objection would 
still be sustained and they would have to return such 
a verdict from the evidence that they notv have as they 
deemed proper." (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court correctly refused plaintiff's motion for a 
directed verdict. 
11 
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2. The plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof on 
the issue of liability, and the verdict is contrary to the evidence 
and against law. 
3. The court erred in instructing the jury on the measure 
of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The appellant's characterization of the terms of the lease 
shows that it has been led astray by its own circumlocution 
in the three-page document. The construction asked for by 
appellant is to the effect that in event repairs to the compressor 
are necessary while it is being used by the lessee, the lessee 
will pay the amount asked for by the lessor. Actually, there 
were two material provisions of the lease; and, assuming a 
right to recover, the amount of recoverable damages depends 
upon the paragraph of the lease under which the repair charges 
are claimed. 
First, there is a promise to pay the plaintiff's regular 
charges for Hlabor and materials" in event of Haccident or 
breakage'' to the machine. This promise appears in Paragraph 
14. Also, defendant promised to maintain the machine ttin as 
good a condition as when delivered, ordinary wear and tear 
excepted," and for failure to do this, the defendant promised 
to pay plaintiff's ndamages." What the plaintiff has insisted 
on doing throughout the trial and in its brief to this court, is 
12 
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calculating its ndamages" on the basis of its ((regular charges," 
whether for "labor and materials," or for something else. 
The lease doesn't contemplate any such thing. And if the jury 
was confused in its deliberation, the confusion resulted from 
the failure of the plaintiff to take a stand on the kind of 
claim it had. Plaintiff wanted to be able to recover under either 
theory since it wasn't sure (and apparently still isn't) which 
one may be supported by the evidence. 
The statements of law quoted in plaintiff's brief are 
interesting and represent the point of view with which defend-
ant agrees, i.e., that if there is undisputed evidence on a point 
it does not need to go to the jury, provided it is from a proper 
source, is not weakened by cross-examination and there is 
no reason for not believing it. Plaintiff's law is better than its 
proof. Even the legal encyclopedia cited by the plaintiff 
adopted the view that the testimony of a witness need not 
be believed if it is conflicting and contradictory or susceptible 
of inherent weaknesses or improbabilities or incongruities which 
"in and of themselves naturally arise to contradict or impeach 
the weight and credibility of the utterances of the witnesses.'' 
This view is supported by decided cases. 
All of plaintiff's witnesses were interested in the outcome 
of the suit, and there is good authority for the proposition that 
this alone entitles defendant to a jury determination-whether 
the testimony is inherently weak or not. 
As stated in Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing 
Company, 172 U.S. 401,43 L. Ed. 492, 19 Sup. Ct. 233 (1899): 
(( * * * While the jury has no right to arbitrarily 
disregard the positive testimony of unimpeached and 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
uncontradicted witnesses * * * , the very courts that 
lay down this rule qualify it by saying the mere fact 
that the witness is interested in the result of the suit 
is deemed sufficient to require the credibility of his 
testimony to be submitted to the jury as a question of 
f " act. 
A like view was taken by the Supreme Court of California 
in Langley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 41 Cal. 2d 655, 
262 P.2d 846 ( 1953), in which the only evidence relating to 
damages was that of the plaintiff. The court said that ((although 
plaintiff's testimony was the only evidence concerning the value 
of the fish, the jury was the sole judge of his credibility and 
should have been left free to disbelieve him." 
Admitted! y, there are some courts that hold that a verdict 
may be directed despite the fact that witnesses are interested 
in the outcome of the trial; admittedly, too, the interest of the 
employees of the plaintiff is not as great as that of the plaintiff 
itself. However, the rule adopted by most of the courts is that 
where a party is interested in the outcome of the trial his 
credibility must always be regarded as involving an issue of 
fact which must go to the jury. 
Whether or not the interest of the plaintiff's witnesses was 
such that their credibility should be passed upon by the jury 
regardless of the positive character of the testimony, the 
testimony itself was not positive and necessarily worthy of 
belief. Many of the witnesses were unsure of themselves; there 
were contradictions on the basis of charges and as to the cause 
of the damage to the machine; and it was clear that the charges 
made by the plaintiff did not represent the cost of repairing 
the machine. In addition, the jury could believe from the 
14 
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testimony of the workmen and Mr. Arnold, that the machine 
was due for an overhaul at the time it was leased to the 
defendant, and that a substantial share of the charges should 
be borne by the plainiff because of enhancement of the value 
of the machine-in other words, that the charges were not 
to "repair the damage" but to {(repair the damage and overhaul 
the com pressor.'' 
It is not incumbent upon a party to introduce witnesses 
of his own to testify to certain facts if the testimony on the 
other side doesn't necessarily support the facts. In the instant 
case much of the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses was 
improbable or contradictory, or tended to show that recovery 
should not be allowed in the amount claimed. As said by the 
the Supreme Court of Florida in Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 
498, 146 So. 241 ( 1933): 
ttMuch of the evidence offered in plaintiffs in error's 
behalf, while uncontroverted, appears to be discredited 
in many particulars. Such evidence is not necessarily 
binding upon the court in the consideration of a motion 
for a directed verdict. Testimony may be unimpeached 
by any direct evidence to the contrary, and yet be so 
contrary to natural laws, inherently improbable or 
unreasonable, opposed to common knowledge, incon-
sistent with other circumstances established in evidence, 
or so contradictory within itself, as to be subject to 
rejection by the court or jury as; a trier of the facts. * * * 
While the testimony of an unimpeached witness is 
not to be arbitrarily disregarded, and must be measured 
by the standard of common experience in human con-
duct or business usage, there may be such an inherent 
improbability in the statements of a witness as to 
induce the court or jury to disregard his evidence, even 
in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony. A 
15 
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witness may be contradicted by the facts he states as 
completely as by direct adverse testimony. There may 
be likewise so many omissions in this account of par-
ticular transactions, or his own conduct, as to discredit 
his whole story." 
To like effect is Horicon v. Langlois's Estate, 115 Vt. 470, 
66 A.2d 16, 9 A.L.R. 2d 195 ( 1949), in which the court stated 
that ((even though the evidence is undisputed, it may be of 
such a character as to afford ground for opposing inferences 
of fact and, if so, there is a jury question." See also Jordon v. 
O;Connor, 99 Cal. App. 2d 632, 222 P.2d 322 (1950) and 
Anderson v. Liljengren, 50 Minn. 3, 52 N.W. 219 (1892); 
and generally, 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Section 366. 
Under Paragraph 5 of the lease, the measure of recovery 
is ((all damages to the equipment, except the usual and ordinary 
wear and tear." The cases hold that damages for injuries to 
personal property are arrived at by subtracting the value 
immediately after the injury from the value immediately before 
the injury; that in the absence of direct evidence of value, 
the cost of repairs may be taken into account; and that enhance-
ment in value because of the repairs must be taken into 
consideration. Angerman Co., Inc., v. Edgemon et ux., 76 
Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169 ( 1930) ; Gen. Exchange Ins. Corp. 
v. Young, 206 S.W. 2d 683 ( 1947), affirmed, 212 S.W. 2d 
396, 357 Mo. 1099. [Loss of use may be an element of 
damages; but in the instant case it was neither pleaded nor 
a basis for it proved]. Plaintiffs own evidence was that the 
charges did not represent its cost of repair. 
If {i~t':/a'' seeks to base its right to recover on the 
provisions of Paragraph 10 of the lease, that is, for ~~accident 
16 
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to or breakage of" any part of the equipment, the proof still 
does not justify the amount sought. Under Paragraph 10 the 
n1easure of recovery is plaintiff's regular charges for any 
"material or labor" to repair the damage. Plaintiff's invoices 
include teregular charges" for a number of things besides 
"material or labor": overhead costs, expenses, mileage, tele-
phone calls, among others; and some charges for . things 
unrelated to repair, e.g., engine oil, oil filters and fuel filters. 
Moreover, the jury could believe the charges went beyond 
those necessary for terepair," and that some of the charges 
were made for an overhaul that was due in any event. 
Under either theory of plaintiff, the jury was entitled to take 
into consideration the various charges made by the plaintiff 
for things other than materials and labor; the ((mark-up," 
and the fact that it varied '"rith the items; the amount of mark-
up on the compressor itself, from approximately $12,500.00 
(plaintiff's costs) to $18,000.00 (the ((list price"); the fact 
that some charges represented work plaintiff did in its own 
behalf and some represented charges for bookkeeping and ~or 
correcting a job it failed to do right in the first instance. 
II 
;' THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN 
~ OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY, AND THE 
~ VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND 
~ AGAINST LAW. 
It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the damages it seeks to 
;.- recover resulted either from tcaccident or breakage" to the 
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machine within the terms of the lease, or from failure of the 
defendant to maintain the machine in the same condition as 
received, ((usual and ordinary wear and tear excepted." 
Plaintiff's witness parade, including the qualified mechanic, 
Mr. Liese, testified that they did not know how a metal particle 
found its way into the compressor and became so lodged as to 
block the flow of oil. Some speculated as to what might have 
happened, but there was no clear evidence as to what did 
happen. 
The other evidence in the case points out conclusively 
that the damage to the machine resulted not from anything 
the defendant did, and not from any failure to maintain the 
machinery, but from the failure of the plaintiff to use reasonable 
care to see that the equipment was in proper condition before 
shipment to the lessee, as required by Paragraph 4 of the 
lease. It is apparent that the oil filter must have been dirty 
when shipped to the defendant, since it is uncontradicted that 
the defendant used the machine only 77 hours prior to the 
breakdown, and that it is not necessary, under standards set 
by the manufacturer, to clean the oil filter in less than 100 
hours (R. 144; Exhibit 7, p. 11). It is also clear that had 
the machine been proper! y maintained, a metal particle would 
have been stopped by the filter. Moreover, even if, for some 
strange reason, the oil filter did not pick up the particle, still 
the oil starvaction would not do such damage to a machine 
properly maintained and cared for prior to shipment. There 
are safety features built into the machine to shut it off in event 
air, water or oil become too hot (R. 136, 152-153; Exhibit 7, 
pp. 13-14). 
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It i~ , ~~~~t that the machine had not been cared for 
by the t and that the damage resulted directly from 
that lack of care. Since the damage to the machine was to be 
naturally expected, considering the condition of the machine, 
and would have resulted merely frotn operation of the machine, 
the damage was "usual and ordinary wear and tear" within 
the meaning of the lease. Cf. Drouin v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 335, 
67 Atl. 825, 827 ( 1907); Taylor v. Campbell, 123 App .Div. 
698, 108 N.Y.S. 399, 400 (1908). 
In addition, the plaintiff, in its proof, lumped together 
both recoverable and non-recoverable damages and thus failed 
to meet the burden of proof as to damages. Johnson v. Hughes, 
120 Utah 50, 232 P.2d 362 (1951). 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff, during the trial and in its request for instructions, 
tended to fuse and confuse the two paragraphs of the lease 
under which recovery had to be based. As pointed out above, 
the measure of recovery was dependent upon whether there 
was ccaccident or breakage" to the machine, or a failure of 
the defendant to return the compressor in the condition it 
was at the time delivered to the defendant, except for usual 
and ordinary wear and tear. Plaintiff would be entitled to its 
regular charges for cclabor and materials,n or its legal damages. 
Instruction No. 7, to which defendant objected, tends to confuse 
the two sections of the lease, and permits plaintiff to recover 
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not only regular charges for nmaterial or labor," but also to 
recover ((reasonable" charges and expenses incurred for travel, 
telephone, towing and meals incurred in connection with the 
repairs. Such reasonable charges and expenses might be properly 
considered in determining the amount of the ((damages" to 
the plaintiff. But the plaintiff can't have it both ways. Either 
it is entitled to its regular charges for ((material or labor" as 
agreed to in the lease, or it is entitled to its ((damages." 
By Instruction No.8 the court told the jury that the amount 
of plaintiffs recovery should not be diminished by reason of 
the fact that new parts used in repairing the machine were in 
better condition than the replaced parts were at the time the 
lease was entered into, since ((the evidence is uncontradicted 
that used parts were unavailable." 
The evidence was not uncontradicted that used parts were 
not ((available." Mr. Liese testified that he would not use such 
parts in the com pressor. 
Moreover, the obligation of the defendant was to make 
the plaintiff whole, not to pay for the overhaul and betterment 
of its machine. The cases that have considered the problem 
are in harmony in saying that the enhancement in value of the 
machine resulting from the repairs must be taken into con-
sideration in determining the measure of damages. Gen. Exch. 
Ins. Co. v. Young, 206 S.W. 2d 683,aff'd, 212 S.W. 2d 396, 
357 Mo. 1099 (1947) supra; Restatement of Torts, § 928. 
This would be true regardless of which paragraph of the 
lease recovery is based upon, for what the defendant promised 
to do was to repair the damages to or breakage of the machine, 
not build a new machine or replace the old machine with a 
new one. 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that if a business organization engaged in 
the leasing of machines for a price wants to have the machine 
maintained, repaired, and overhauled by the lessees throughout 
the life of the machine and longer, the desire should be spelled 
out with greater candor in the lease. The plaintiff in this case 
has ignored the rule of contra proferentem and argued for a 
new rule, pro proferentem, in substance rejected by this court in 
Close v. Blumenthal, (No. 9196), not yet reported. Admittedly, 
it would be possible to draw a lease stating that the lessee 
shall pay for any repairs that become necessary during the 
period in which the machine is in the lessee's possession. Such 
a provision in a lease would be easy to understand, and the 
lessee, knowing its terms, might exercise some judgment as 
to whether it desired to enter into such a risky arrangement. 
It is apparent that the draftsman of the Arnold Machinery 
Company lease wanted the lessee to assume all the risks-but 
without being aware of it. The trouble is that a hole was left 
in it, and the lease failed to provide for the ((absolute liability" 
now contended for by Arnold Machinery Company. The 
lessee's promise was to ((maintain" and to pay agreed charges 
for c c accident or breakage.'' 
Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving that the 
defendant had anything to do with the damage to the machine. 
Plaintiff failed to prove that it took steps to maintain the 
machine or to inspect it or check it out prior to delivery to 
the defendant. It failed to prove the cause of the damage. 
And plaintiff's own evidence and the manufacturer's 
manuals prove that the damage could not have occurred to 
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the machine if it had been maintained properly prior to the 
time of its delivery to the defendant, since there were safety 
devices to turn the compressor off. Plaintiff failed to sustain 
its burden of proof and defendant was entitled to a judgment, 
no cause of action. 
Moreover, even if the court could conclude that the 
plaintiff had introduced enough evidence that the jury might 
find some failure on the part of the defendant, still the plaintii1 
did not differentiate its damages and did not satisfactorily 
prove what damages resulted from the conduct of the defendant 
and what costs were incurred because of the inherent character 
of the machine prior to the time of its delivery to defendant. 
This being true, plaintiff has failed to prove its damages and 
defendant was entitled to judgment. 
Finally, the court misdirected the jury on the question of 
damages, and left it open for the jury to award certain damages 
to the plaintiff to which it was not entitled under any theory. 
By its Instruction No. 7 the court gave the jury the impression 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover both its regular charges 
for {(material and labor," and reasonable charges for all other 
kinds of damages resulting from the breakdown of the com-
pressor. It is true, of course, that other instructions tended 
to give the defendant the benefit of enhancement and to spell 
out the theories of the two clauses of the lease; but this very 
fact would tend to confuse the jury and lead it to arrive at 
conclusions with respect to damages that were not warranted 
on the evidence. 
Plaintiff's appeal is not well taken, and the case should 
be reversed and sent back to the lower court with instructions 
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to enter judgment in favor of the defendant and against th( 
plaintiff, no cause of action. And if a new trial is ordered, it 
should be on the whole case, since misdirection on the issue 
of damages must have affected the verdict as to liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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